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I.
"You mean you're going to write a positive review?" a col-
league asked. "I don't see what else I can do," I replied. The reader
will be the judge as to whether or not I managed to do something
else, but at any rate it remains true that my response to Richard
Posner's new book The Problems of Jurisprudence1 is strongly
positive.
In The Problems of Jurisprudence, Judge Posner announces
that he is a pragmatist, by which he means that he rejects many if
not most of the goals of legal theory, especially the chief goal of
offering an account of the law that is at once comprehensively ab-
stract, strongly normative, and predictive of judicial outcomes,
that is, of decisions and holdings. He begins by declaring that he
will "argue against 'artificial reason,' against Dworkin's 'right-an-
swer' thesis, against formalism, against overarching conceptions of
justice such as 'corrective justice,' 'natural law,' and 'wealth max-
imization'... against 'strong legal positivism'" (p 26), and he ends
by proclaiming that the search for "an overarching principle for
resolving legal disputes" (p 392) has failed and that "[no keys
were found" (p 455). The process of finding no keys gives the book
its structure. In other treatises on jurisprudence the argument is
t Professor of English and Law, Duke University.
1 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard, 1990). All page num-
bers in the text refer to this book.
1447
The University of Chicago Law Review
built up step by step into what promises to be a magnificent edifice
(or empire), but here is "no edifice" (p 69), only the repeated at-
tempt to lay still another foundation that is almost immediately
found to be as "rotten" as the last one (p 392).
Something of the feel of this negative project emerges early on
in the discussion of objectivity. Objectivity, Posner tells us, comes
in three flavors. First, and most ambitiously, there is "objectivity
as correspondence to an external reality" (p 7); second, the scien-
tific sense of objectivity as a procedure that is replicable indepen-
dently of the differences between agents who execute it: "A finding
is replicable in this sense if different investigators, not sharing the
same ideological or other preconceptions ... would be bound to
agree with it" (p 7); and, third, there is objectivity in the sense of
"merely reasonable-that is, as not willful, not personal, not (nar-
rowly) political, not utterly indeterminate though not determinate
in the ontological or scientific sense, but as amenable to and ac-
companied by persuasive though not necessarily convincing expla-
nation" (p 7).
The first kind of objectivity-the conforming of our proce-
dures to an independent and external truth-"is out of the ques-
tion in most legal cases" (p 31). The second, scientific or replicable
and convergent objectivity, "is sometimes attainable, but given the
attitudes of and the constraints on the legal profession, and the
character of the problems it deals with, often not" (p 31); and the
third form of objectivity, named by Posner "conversational objec-
tivity," the objectivity that seems achieved in moments (however
temporary) of successful persuasion, "is attainable-but that isn't
saying much" (p 31). It isn't saying much because its attainability
is not a matter of method or planful design (conversational objec-
tivity cannot be generated by a mechanical procedure; if it could it
would be replicable and scientific objectivity) and therefore it is in
some sense fortuitous. In any situation it may or may not occur,
depending on the degree of homogeneity in the relevant commu-
nity, the relation of available argumentative resources to skillful
advocates, the pressures for generating a conclusion in one direc-
tion or another, the routes by which that decision might be
reached, and innumerable other contingencies that may or may
not meet together in a happy conjunction.
In a word, conversational objectivity is a political achieve-
ment, and therefore an achievement that is the antithesis of objec-
tivity as many understand it: a state of certitude that attends the
identification and embrace of bedrock and abiding fact and/or
principle. To those for whom objectivity can only come in this
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(hard) form, the temporary outcomes of an indeterminate and
messy institutional "conversation" hardly meet the test. Neither is
the test met by scientific or replicable objectivity as Posner de-
scribes it, because it is distinguishable from the softer, conversa-
tional kind only in degree. "The only way to make [the law] more
objective"-the only way to kick legal objectivity up a notch from
the conversational to the replicable--"is to make the courts and
the legislatures more homogeneous, culturally and politically"
(p 32).
In short, the only difference between scientific and conversa-
tional objectivity is a difference between a community in which as-
sumptions are widely shared and firmly in place, and a community
in which assumptions differ and agreement must be repeatedly ne-
gotiated. And because the stability of the first community is itself
a contingent matter, a stage in the history of a discipline or a soci-
ety, it can always be upset by an unforeseen circumstance.' Scien-
tific or replicable objectivity is therefore no less political than
conversational objectivity; it is just a matter of how much homoge-
neity the powers that be have managed to achieve. "Legal thought
cannot be made objective by being placed in correspondence with
the 'real' world. It owes whatever objectivity it has to cultural uni-
formity rather than to metaphysical reality or methodological
rigor" (p 30).
If methodological rigor goes south in the pragmatist wind, can
formalism be far behind? Formalism is the hope that legal out-
comes can be generated by a procedure that is not hostage to any a
priori specification of value: "[t]he only prerequisite to being a for-
malist is having supreme confidence in one's premises and in one's
methods of deriving conclusions from them" (p 40). However, adds
Posner, the formalist's confidence is unfounded because the prem-
ises are always contestable and therefore incapable of providing a
firm foundation for the reasoning that flows from them. So long as
one does not notice the contestability, "decisions will appear to be
strongly objective because logically deducible" (p 48); but once the
curtain is lifted the observer will "see that the decisions are no
more objective in an ultimate sense than those made under [a]
more frankly ad hoc regime" (p 48). One may intone with "great
resonance" the "idea of treating like things alike," but the "idea is
empty without specification of the criteria for 'likeness'; and ...
those criteria are political" (p 42). So much for what H.L.A. Hart
' This is the great lesson of Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Chicago, 2d ed 1970).
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calls the idea of justice in its simplest form, ".... the notion that
what is to be applied to a multiplicity of different persons is the
same general rule, undeflected by prejudice, interest, or caprice. ' 3
What is true of large abstractions like the "idea of justice" is
no less true of rules; they too are political in their operation, says
Posner, because although they may be invoked as formal and uni-
versal, they are almost always employed in the service of "ad hoc
exceptions and adjustments" (p 46). Rules of a truly formal kind
may perhaps be found in games where the player is not free to
decide, for example, that his rook will simply not "be captured by
his opponent's queen" (p 50), but in the law judges can do just
that and say that "they are doing so in order to comply with a
higher level rule" (p 50). In games, the rules apply to carefully cir-
cumscribed and static worlds, but the world in which legal rules
function is protean and ever changing: the richness of its phenom-
ena greatly exceeds any attempt to formally contain it. Since
"[r]ules make dichotomous cuts in continuous phenomena" (p 46),
a rule "suppresses potentially relevant circumstances of the dis-
pute" (p 44) and a judge is free to decide what will or will not be
suppressed.
Thus, rather than constraining judges, rules offer judges the
opportunity to engage in temperamentally preferred activities by
allowing them either to confine or expand the judicial gaze. Judges
tolerant of "untidiness, even disorder" will be "highly sensitive to
the particulars of each case," while judges invested in tradition and
continuity will defer to already in place authorities, "legislators,
the founding fathers, higher or earlier judges" (p 49). Although
judges of both kinds will employ rules, the rules will function not
as checks on personal preferences (the standard account of rules
and their value), but as their vehicle: "judges are not bound by the
rules to do anything" (p 47). Here is the formalist fear writ large, a
legal system that is no system at all, but a ramshackle non-struc-
ture made up of bits of everything and held together (when it is
held together) by transitory political purposes: "The common law
is a vast collection of judge-made rules ... loosely tethered to de-
batable interpretations of ambiguous enactments" (p 47).
Loose tethering, however, turns out to be all the tethering one
needs in the Posnerian vision, for while "exact inquiry" (p 71) and
"pure" reason are unrealizable ideals, practical reason takes up the
slack. Practical reason "is a grab bag that includes anecdote, intro-
3 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 202 (Oxford, 1961).
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spection, imagination, common sense, empathy, imputation of mo-
tives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom,
memory, 'experience,' intuition, and induction" (p 73). In one
sense, as Posner points out, the list is too long, because its compo-
nents are not all of a kind and are sometimes not discrete; but it is
also too short because some of the entries can be divided and sub-
divided. It is that untidiness that makes practical reason what it is,
not a self-enclosed mode of algorithmic or mechanical calculation,
but an ever changing collection of rules of thumb, doctrines, prov-
erbs, precedents, folk-tales, prejudices, aspirations, goals, fears,
and, above all, beliefs.
In the realm of formal objective reasoning (if there were such
a thing) belief (personal preference) is precisely what is kept at
bay so that the impersonal logic of the deductive machine can run
smoothly. But in the (real) world of practical reasoning, be-
liefs-the intuitions "that lie so deep that we do not know how to
question them" (p 73)-serve as the premises of all reasoning.
Rather than being controlled or trumped by evidence (as they are
in the popular picture of "good" reasoning), beliefs pass on the
usefulness and relevance of different kinds of evidence and put the
kinds together in ways that sort with an already-in-place structure.
"Pure" reasoning generates a basis for the taking up of purposes;
but practical reasoning begins with purposes, with inclinations to-
ward the inhabiting and building of this or that world, and those
inclinations influence and direct the way evidence is marshalled
and even seen.
Posner illustrates the point with the doctrine of precedent.
The doctrine is that precedent controls, but, says Posner, what re-
ally controls is how one "chooses to read the precedent"; "the key
to the decision is precisely that choice, a choice not dictated by
precedent-a choice as to what the precedent shall be" (p 95).
That choice will not have been driven by logic, but rather by the
direction in which the judge wanted to go. This does not mean that
the judge can decide in any direction he or she pleases. The routes
of choice, indeed the alternative forms in which choice can even
appear, are constrained by the present shape of practical reason-
ing, by what arguments will work, what categories are firmly in
place, what distinctions can be confidently invoked.
Posner asks if a precedent could be distinguished on the basis
that in the earlier case "the plaintiff had been left-handed and in
the present one the plaintiff is right-handed?", and answers, "[i]t
could not-but only because there is no consideration of policy or
ethics that would justify so narrow an interpretation" (p 96). The
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state of the culture, of what it will hear as reasonable (not the
force of reason itself) bars a judge, at least now, from grabbing
hold of the distinction between left and right-handedness; but
there might come a day (perhaps in the context of a new and per-
suasive account of criminal behavior) when the distinction carries
legal weight, means something in terms related to the concerns of
the legal community. Practical reasoning is not a fixed category
and its content will not always be the same, but whatever it con-
tains, its mode of calculation will be rhetorical rather than logical,
a matter first of determining or sensing where the lines of author-
ity lie-what previous holdings will strike one as settling a ques-
tion, what rules can be invoked without challenge or qualification,
what maxims ("no one should be permitted to profit from his own
wrong") will close down discussion, what analogies have stood the
test of time, "what politically accredited source" (p 82) has issued
what citable pronouncements, what goals now go virtually unques-
tioned in the realm of "rational" deliberation-and then of "work-
ing" these "authoritative" materials in the direction of one's pur-
poses, one's inclinations, one's intuitions, one's beliefs.
In this vision authority itself is rhetoricized and politicized.
Authorities do not come ready made in the form of a pure calculus
or a scriptural revelation; rather, they are made, fashioned in the
course of debate and conflict, established by acts that are finally
grounded in nothing firmer than persuasion (another name for
practical reasoning) and so finally fashioned and maintained by
force: "To be blunt, the ultima ratio of law is . . . force-precisely
what is excluded even by the most latitudinarian definitions of ra-
tionality" (p 83). Posner here endorses and expands on the view of
Holmes which he had earlier quoted: "'I believe that force, miti-
gated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio, and
between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of world
I see no remedy except force'" (p 19 n 29). 4 The conclusion is of
course a shocking one, but it follows inevitably from every other
part of Posner's argument and it does so for a reason Holmes's
sentence nicely highlights: disputes between "groups who want to
make inconsistent kinds of world" could be resolved by rational
rather than forceful means only if the content and method of ra-
tionality could be stipulated apart from the agenda of any particu-
lar group. However, it is just that kind of specification Posner rules
out as a possibility when he declares unavailable to the law (and to
Quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Letter to Sir Frederick Pollock (Feb 1, 1920), in
Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed, Holmes-Pollock Letters 36 (Harvard, 1961).
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much else) objectivity in the ontological sense and grants to the
law only scientific or replicable objectivity (sometimes attainable)
and conversational objectivity (contingently attainable).
As I have already observed, the second and third senses of ob-
jectivity are actually one and the same, because they are distin-
guished not by an epistemological, but by a social/political condi-
tion. In a discipline that can be said to display scientific
objectivity-for example, science or at least some corners of
it-potentially disputable premises are simply not in dispute for
reasons of history, disciplinary politics, societal expectations, etc.
In a discipline characterized by conversational objectivity, disputes
are everywhere and basic premises are often seen to be "up for
grabs" (although as Posner correctly points out, not all of them
will be so seen at the same time). In either disciplinary situa-
tion-the one of potential but quiescent dispute or the one of per-
vasive and continuing dispute-the settling of dispute, should it
break out, can only be accomplished by political means, by the in-
voking of some sacrosanct (but itself contestable if anyone dared,
or even thought, to contest it) first principle of the enterprise ("if
we are to remain a government of laws, not men . . ."), or by the
pronouncement of someone in a position to make his or her pro-
nouncements stick, or by the taking of a vote as the result of which
the dispute has been officially or administratively settled (but is
sure to erupt on another day), or by the intervention of an armed
force.
In this list (certainly not exhaustive) of possibly "authorita-
tive" actions, only the last is usually given the name "force," but in
the absence of any neutral calculus or principle to which dispu-
tants might have recourse, the other actions are but softened ver-
sions of the last, instances of what Holmes refers to as the mitiga-
tion of "good manners." To be sure, this is a mitigation not to be
lightly dismissed. Without good manners-a weak phrase for the
willingness to refrain from bashing one's opponent's head
in-civilization itself would fail, not because, as some have been
telling us recently and others had been telling us even before Juve-
nal's third satire, we have lost hold of first principles and basic
truths, but because, given the unavailability of such principles and
truths to limited mortals (the phrase is redundant), we would fall
instantly to fratricide (and to matricide, patricide, genocide, and
every other cide) did we not invest our energies in procedures and
habits designed (as it has become fashionable to say) to keep the
conversation going. Force, in short, comes in hard and soft ver-
sions, and all things being equal, soft is better than hard (a rever-
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sal of the usual masculinist metaphor underlying much of aca-
demic discourse). But not always, because all things are not equal.
That is, at any moment one is always committed to goals and
premises in such a way that certain challenges to them will be per-
ceived as socially, not personally, disastrous; and when those chal-
lenges arise, it will seem that a soft response-turning the other
cheek, writing another page-is a betrayal of one's values and of
one's responsibility to the world.
At that point the distinction between legitimate and illegiti-
mate force will be invoked, a distinction, as H.L.A. Hart saw, that
is basic to the law's claim to be law rather than force in law's cloth-
ing, but a distinction that will then be counter-invoked in another
form-the line differently but just as sincerely drawn-by those
whose depredations you feel compelled to resist. At bottom, what
is unreasonable is what the other fellow believes, and illegitimate
force is the action he is taking in defense of his beliefs. As Learned
Hand put it in a statement Posner also cites: "'Values are incom-
mensurable. You can get a solution only by a compromise, or call
it what you will. It must be one that people won't complain of too
much; but you cannot expect any more objective measure'" (p 129
n 10).1
You cannot expect any more because of the condition whose
strong acknowledgement is the basis of all pragmatist thinking, the
condition as Posner names it, of heterogeneity or difference, as I
would name it. (The fact that pragmatism too has its foundational
premise is not a contradiction of its anti-foundationalism because
this particular premise-the irreducibility of difference-is anti-
foundationalism.) In a heterogeneous world, a world in which per-
sons are situated-occupying particular places with particular pur-
poses pursued in relation to particular goals, visions, and hopes as
they follow from holding (or being held by) particular beliefs-no
one will be in a situation that is universal or general (that is, no
situation at all), and therefore no one's perspective (a word that
gives the game away) can lay claim to privilege. In that kind of
world-a world of difference-the stipulation both of what is (of
the facts) and of what ought to be will always be a politically an-
gled one, and in the (certain) event of a clash of stipulations, the
mechanisms of adjudication, whether in the personal or institu-
tional realms, will be equally political.
' Quoting Learned Hand, "A Personal Confession," in The Spirit of Liberty: Papers
and Addresses of Learned Hand 302, 307 (Knopf, 3d ed 1960) (emphasis added).
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How then does the business of law get done? "If two social
visions clash, which prevails? ... [H]ow does a judge choose be-
tween competing social visions?" (p 148). Posner's answer to these
questions will be troubling to those who seek a jurisprudence in
which policy considerations have been either eliminated or subor-
dinated (A la Dworkin), but it is an inevitable answer given every-
thing that precedes the question: "Often the choice will be made
on the basis of deeply held personal values, and often these values
will be impervious to argument" (pp 148-49). This last is particu-
larly devastating, since argument, in the sense of the marshalling
of evidence that will be compelling to any actor no matter what his
or her "personal values," is supposedly the very life of the law.
This is not to say, Posner hastens to add, that because a judge's
personal values are impervious to argument, they are impervious to
change. Change can and does occur, not however by a process of
"reasoned exposition" (p 149), but through conversions, defined
nicely as "a sudden deeply emotional switch from one non-rational
cluster of beliefs to another that is no more (often less) rational"
(p 150).
And what brings that switch about? Almost anything and
nothing in particular. That is, there is no sure route-no sequence
of formalizable or even probabilizable steps-to conversion, nor are
there means or stimuli that are "by nature" too weak to produce it.
Conversion can follow upon anything-reading at random a verse
from the Bible, falling off one's horse on the road to Damascus,
suddenly seeing the first gray hair-for anything, given the right
history, psychology, pressuring circumstances, etc., can "jar people
out of their accustomed ways of thinking" (p 150).
Posner's example is the women's movement, which he says has
become influential because "[m]any women and some men" have
been brought to see the role of women "in a different light," not
however "by being shown evidence that this is the way things 're-
ally' are, but by being offered a fresh perspective that, once
glimpsed, strikes many with a shock of recognition" (p 150). But
not all. The metaphors, analogies, revisionist histories, slogans
("the personal is the political") that have struck some as a revela-
tion ("once I saw through a glass darkly") have struck others as
absurd or irrelevant. If the minds of people, including judges, are
changed by conversion rather than by the operation of reason and
logic, then change is a contingent matter and predictability-both
prized and claimed by the law-is a chimera. Of course, contin-
gency can sometimes take hold, not however as the result of a plan
or campaign, but as the result of notions or vocabularies that
somehow get to be "in the air" and effect a "change of outlook"
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which, when it is noticed (by a historian or social commentator),
will be seen to have been caused by no one in particular and cer-
tainly not by any rational process. It is just that something that
was once "virtually unthinkable" (p 151) now goes without saying.
"My point," concludes Posner, "is that the "great turning points in
twentieth-century American law (and in law, period) [were] not
the product of deep reflection on the meaning of the Constitution
... but instead reflect changing outlooks" (p 152).
II.
With statements like this, Posner puts the cap on his anti-
essentialist, anti-foundational, anti-rational (in the strong sense),
anti-metaphysical, and deeply pragmatist view of the law, and it is
perhaps superfluous for me to say that I agree with him on almost
every point. Indeed, as I look back on the preceding pages, I see
little effort to separate my account of Posner's argument from my
own elaborations of it. Of course, I have some quibbles, but that's
what they are, even though I shall now be so ungenerous as to re-
hearse them.
When Posner says that "[a] judicial holding normally will
trump even a better-reasoned academic analysis because of the
value that the law places on stability" (p 95), he seems to accord
both a privilege and an independence to "reason" that he else-
where withholds. Would it not be truer to his larger argument to
replace "better-reasoned" with "differently reasoned," and recog-
nize that the desire for stability is itself a reason, and one no better
or worse than the academic reasons that are put forward in the
context of institutional norms? And when Posner criticizes the
"plain-meaning approach" of excluding consideration of "the com-
municative intent[] and broader purposes" of statutes (p 278), he
seems to think that such an exclusion is possible, that one could, in
fact, read in a way that bracketed purposes and intentions not al-
ready "in" the writing; but (as I have argued at length elsewhere 6)
language is only construable within the assumption of some or
other human purpose. No act of reading can stop at the plain
meaning of a document, because that meaning itself will have
emerged in the light of some stipulation of intentional circum-
stances, of purposes held by agents situated in real world situa-
tions. The difference between ways of reading will not be between
6 See generally Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and The
Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Duke, 1989).
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a reading that takes communicative intent into account and a
reading that doesn't, but between readings that proceed in the
light of differently assumed communicative intents. Formalist or
literalist or "four corners" interpretation is not inadvisable (as
Posner seems to suggest); it is impossible.
And finally in this short list of occasional but not fatal lapses
or slips, it really will not do, in the context of the book's informing
spirit, to contrast "persuasion by rhetoric" to "the coolest forms of
reasoned exposition" (p 149). Reasoned exposition (which will have
different shapes at different times in different disciplines) is itself
just one form of rhetoric, cooler perhaps if the measure of heat is a
decibel count, but impelled by a vision as partisan and contestable
as that informing any rhetoric that dares to accept that name.
As I have already said, these disagreements with Posner do
not amount to much, but that should not be taken to indicate that
I have no real quarrels with this book. For there is a strain in it,
muted at first but heard more often in its second half, that I be-
lieve to be at deep odds with Posner's strongest insights. Let me
try to focus my criticism by returning to the moment when Posner
declares that of the three kinds of objectivity, the
third-conversational objectivity-is attainable in the law, but, he
adds, "that isn't saying much" (p 31). It seems to me, however,
that in the following pages he sometimes thinks that too much fol-
lows from having said "that." Indeed, in my view anything that
would be said to follow from the fact of "conversational objectiv-
ity" would be too much, for it would be to confuse a pragmatist
account of the law with a pragmatist program.
A pragmatist account of the law speaks to the question of how
the law works and gives what I think to be the right answer: the
law works not by identifying and then hewing to some overarching
set of principles, or logical calculus, or authoritative revelation, but
by deploying a set of ramshackle and heterogeneous resources in
an effort to reach political resolutions of disputes that then must
be framed (this is the law's requirement and the public's desire) in
apolitical and abstract terms (fairness, equality, "what justice re-
quires"). By the standards applied to determinate and principled
procedures, the law fails miserably (this is the charge made by
Critical Legal Studies); but under the pragmatist standard-unsat-
isfactory as a standard to formalists and objectivists, as well as to
deconstructors-the law gets passing and even high marks because
it works. A pragmatist program, in contrast, asks the question
"what follows from the pragmatist account?" and then gives an an-
swer, but by giving an answer pragmatism is unfaithful to its own
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first principle (which is to have none) and turns unwittingly into
the foundationalism and essentialism it rejects.
Posner's answer-his program-takes the form of a pro-scien-
tific, no-nonsense empiricism that is obviously related to the tradi-
tion of legal realism. Signs of this "realist" stance surface early,
when, in the course of setting out the book's plan, he questions the
utility of interpretation as an explanatory concept and declares:
"We might do better to discard the term" (p 31). Discarding terms
and much else is a favorite move in legal realist polemic and no
one performed it with more flair than Felix Cohen.7 Cohen begins
by heaping scorn on the notion of a corporation as a legal abstrac-
tion, as a fictional entity. "Where is a corporation?" he asks, and
replies that it is "not a question that can be answered by empirical
observation."8 "Nor is it a question," he goes on, "that demands
for its solution any analysis of political considerations or social ide-
als. It is, in fact, a question identical in metaphysical status with
the question which scholastic theologians are supposed to have ar-
gued at great length, 'How many angels can stand on the point of a
needle?' -9 In short, a question directed at a speculative, mythical
non-object which, because it was produced by superstition rather
than observation, gets in the way of seeing things as they really
are. Unfortunately, the law is not (yet) a science and is therefore
susceptible to the appeal of "myths [that] impress the imagination
• ..where more exact discourse would leave minds cold." 10 The
result, Cohen laments, is a world of circular legal reasoning in
which jargon-of-the-trade terms interact with one another "with-
out coming to rest on the floor of verifiable fact."'"
The remedy for this sorry state is implicit in the indictment:
sweep away the magical but substanceless words that make up the
vocabulary of jurisprudence so that we will have an unobstructed
view of the situation and problems to which we could then address
ourselves. If notions of" 'property' and 'due process' were defined
in non-legal terms"-defined, that is, in a descriptive vocabulary
truly in touch with "empirical social facts"-we might be able "to
substitute a realistic, rational scientific account of legal happenings
for the classical theological jurisprudence of concepts."' 2 If we
'Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum L
Rev 809 (1935).
8 Id at 809-10.
9 Id at 810.
" Id at 812.
11 Id at 814.
12 Id at 820-21.
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wean ourselves from "supernatural entities which do not have a
verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith" we may at last
come into contact with "actual experience."13 Once this happens,
once "statistical methods" have brought us close to the "actual
facts of judicial behavior,"' 4 the "realistic lawyer" or judge will be
able to "rise above" all distorting lenses, including both the lens of
"his own moral bias" and the lens of "the moral bias of the legal
author whose treatise he consults.' 5 No longer will he be "fooled
by his own words"16 or by anyone else's.
In these quotations, which could have easily been supple-
mented from the pages of Jerome Frank and other early realists,
we see that the basic realist gesture is a double, and perhaps con-
tradictory, one: first dismiss the myth of objectivity as it is embod-
ied in high sounding but empty legal concepts (the rule of law, the
neutrality of due process) and then replace it with the myth of the
"actual facts" or "exact discourse" or "actual experience" or a "ra-
tional scientific account." That is, go from one essentialism, identi-
fied with natural law or conceptual logic, to another, identified
with the strong empiricism of the social sciences.
The problem with this sequence was long ago pointed out by
Roscoe Pound who, while acknowledging the force of many of the
realists' observations, declared himself "skeptical as to the faith in
ability to find the one unchallengeable basis free from illusion
which alone the new realist takes over from the illusion-ridden ju-
rists of the past."' 7 Given the realist insistence on the una-
voidability of bias and on the value-laden nature of all human ac-
tivities, the recourse to a brute fact level of uninterpretive data
seems, to say the least, questionable, as does the assumption that if
we could only divest ourselves of the special vocabulary of the legal
culture (no longer be fooled by our own words), we could see things
as they really (independently of any discursive system whatsoever)
are. Cohen and Frank are full of scorn for the theological thinking
and for the operation of faith, but as Pound sees, they are no less
the captives of a faith, and of the illusion-if that is the
word-that attends it.
That is, however, not the word. "Illusion" implies the availa-
bility of a point of view uncontaminated by metaphysical entities
IS Id at 822.
" Id at 833.
Is Id at 841.
16 Id.
" Roscoe Pound, A Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 Harv L Rev 697, 699 (1931).
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or by an a priori assumption of values, and as the realists (and
Posner after them) argue in their better moments, there is no such
point of view, no realm of unalloyed non-mediated experience and
no neutral observation language that describes it. The advocate or
jurist who moves from the conceptual apparatus codified in law to
the apparatus of statistical methods and behaviorist psychology
has not exchanged the perspective-specific facts of an artificial dis-
cursive system for the real, unvarnished facts. Rather, he has ex-
changed the facts emergent in one discursive system-one contest-
able articulation of the world-for the facts emergent in another.
It is not that there is no category of the real; it is just that what
fills it will always be a function of the in-place force of some disci-
plinary or community vocabulary. Eliminate the special jargon of
the law, as the realists urge, and you will find yourself not in the
cleared ground of an epistemological reform ("now I see face to
face"), but in the already occupied ground of some other line of
work no less special, no less hostage to commitments it can neither
name nor recognize.
Much of what Posner writes in The Problems of Jurispru-
dence suggests that he should be in substantial agreement with the
previous paragraph. Steeped as he is in the writings of Peirce,
Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Rorty, and Gadamer (not to mention Fish),
he should be immune to the lure of empiricist essentialism, but he
is not. At the end of the chapter on practical reasoning, he com-
plains that the law still carries too much conceptual baggage and
avers that "[t]he situation would be improved if law committed
itself to a simple functionalism or consequentialism" (p 122), that
is, to a program of adjusting the operations of law to precisely
specified social goals in relation to which the law would be self-
consciously subordinate and secondary:
Suppose the sole goal of every legal doctrine and institution
was a practical one. The goal of a new bankruptcy statute, for
example, might be to reduce the number of bankruptcies...
and if the statute failed to fulfill [that goal] . .. it would be
repealed. Law really would be a method of social engineering,
and its structures and designs would be susceptible of objec-
tive evaluation, much like the project of civil engineers. This
would be a triumph of pragmatism. (p 122)
This is a complicated statement that looks forward to several
arguments Posner will later elaborate, including the argument
(more modest than one might have expected) for law and econom-
ics. In his chapter on that approach, Posner rehearses the familiar
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thesis that even though the law may not self-describe its opera-
tions in economic terms, its history indicates that those terms or
something approximating them impel legal actors whether they are
aware of it or not. It is as if somewhere deep down, in the realm of
tacit rather than explicit knowledge, "judges wanted to adopt the
rules, procedures and case outcomes that would maximize society's
wealth" (p 356). "We should be no more surprised that judges talk
in different terms while doing economics than that businessmen
equate marginal cost to marginal revenue without using the terms
and often without knowing what they mean" (pp 372-73).
Here is the meeting point of Posner's declared pragmatism
and his previous self-identification with the law and economics
movement. When Posner says that the goal of every legal doctrine
should be a practical one, he means (in good realist fashion) that
legal doctrine should be reconceptualized so as to accord with the
nitty-gritty facts of social life, and that means reconceptualized in
the language of law and economics, since in his view the language
of law and economics is the language of real motives and actual
goals. If "[t]he object of pragmatic analysis is to lead discussion
away from issues semantic and metaphysical and toward issues
factual and empirical" (p 387), then by Posner's lights pragmatic
analysis and the pragmatic program will succeed when legal con-
cepts and terms have been replaced by economic ones, or when
"the positive economic theory of law will be subsumed under a
broader theory-perhaps, although not necessarily, an economic
theory-of the social behavior we call law" (p 374).
This could possibly happen, but if it ever does, we will not
have escaped semantics (merely verbal entities) and metaphysics
(faith-based declarations of what is), but merely attached ourselves
to new versions of them. As many commentators have observed,
"wealth-maximization," efficiency, pareto superiority, the Kaldor-
Hicks test, and the other components of the law and economics
position are all hostage to metaphysical assumptions, to controver-
sial visions of the way the world is or should be. A transformation
such as Posner seems to desire would not lead to methods "suscep-
tible of objective evaluation" (p 122) but to methods no more
firmly grounded than the wholly contestable premises that "au-
thorize" them. Moreover, and this is the more important point,
should that transformation occur, the result would not be a more
empirically rooted law, but no law at all. The law, as a separate
and distinct area of inquiry and action, would be no more; an en-
terprise of a certain kind would have disappeared from the world
(itself not fixed, but mutable and revisable) of enterprises.
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At issue here is the nature of the desire to which law is a re-
sponse. In Posner's view (although he doesn't put it this way), the
law is answerable to a desire that can be pragmatically defined (the
desire to prevent bankruptcy or protect the integrity of the fam-
ily). Given this view, it makes sense to ask that legal concepts
match up with that desire and to criticize them when they do not.
But I would describe the desire that gives rise to law differently
and more philosophically, in a loose sense of that word. Law
emerges because people desire predictability, stability, equal pro-
tection, the reign of justice, etc., and because they want to believe
that it is possible to secure these things by instituting a set of im-
partial procedures. This incomplete list of the desires behind the
emergence of law is more or less identical with the list of things
Posner debunks in his book, beginning with objectivity, and con-
tinuing with determinate rules, value free adjudication, impersonal
constraints, the right of privacy, freedom of the will, precedent, in-
tention, mind, judicial restraint, etc. Repeatedly he speaks of him-
self as "demystifying" these concepts in the service of "the struggle
against metaphysical entities in law" (p 185), and he writes depre-
catingly of the delusions, pretensions, and false understandings
with which actors in the legal culture deceive themselves.
But the result of success in this struggle, should Posner or
anyone else achieve it, would not be a cleaned-up conceptual uni-
verse, but a universe deprived of the props that must be in place if
the law is to be possessed of a persuasive rationale. In short, the
law will only work-not in the realist or economic sense but in the
sense answerable to the desires that impel its establishment-if
the metaphysical entities Posner would remove are retained; and if
the history of our'life with law tells us anything, it is that they will
be retained, no matter what analysis of either an economic or
deconstructive kind is able to show.
The curious fact is that Posner knows this with at least part of
his mind. Anticipating the objection that the adoption of a behav-
iorist vocabulary (which would have the advantage, he says, of
eliminating "fictitious" entities like minds, intentions, the con-
science, and guilt) will "strip the moral as well as the distinctively
human content from the ... law" (p 177), he replies:
There are no ... grounds for fearing that speculations in the
philosophy of mind are likely to affect respect for, let alone
observance of, law.... Philosophers who believe in determin-
ism behave in their personal lives just like other people. If
freedom is an illusion, it is one of those illusions ... that we




This is exactly right, not (as Posner implies) because human beings
obstinately cling to their "illusions," but because the set of pur-
poses that will lead one to do philosophy of mind and the set of
purposes that lead one to administer or make law are quite differ-
ent, and there is no reason to assume that a conclusion reached in
one area will have an effect on the central tenets of the other.
(More of this later.) Law is centrally about such things as con-
science, guilt, personal responsibility, fairness, impartiality, and no
analysis imported from some other disciplinary context "proving"
that these things do not exist will remove them from the legal cul-
ture, unless of course society decides that a legal culture is a luxury
it can afford to do without.
What Posner calls the "illusions" by which public actors sus-
tain their roles are in fact the assumptions (no more nor less vul-
nerable than any others) that constitute those roles; take them
away (not, as he acknowledges, an easy task) and you take away
the role and all of the advantages it brings to the individual and
the community. As Posner correctly observes, "most judges believe,
without evidence (indeed in the face of the evidence . . .) that the
judiciary's effectiveness depends on a belief by the public that
judges are finders rather than makers of law" (p 190). The implica-
tion is that the belief would be better founded if independent evi-
dence of it could be cited; but this particular belief is itself found-
ing, and comprises a kind of contract between the legal institution
and the public, each believing in the other's belief about itself and
thus creating a world in which expectations and a sense of mutual
responsibility confirm one another without any external support.
Similarly, when judges "persuade themselves and others that their
decisions are dictated by law" (pp 192-93), the act of persuasion is
not a conscious strategic self-deception, but something that comes
with the territory, with the experience of law school, of practice, of
a life in the courts, etc. The result is not, as Posner would have it,
a "false sense of constraint" (p 193), but a sense inseparable from
membership in a community from whose (deep) assumptions one
takes one's very identity. But as I have said, Posner knows all and
he even knows that the fictions he debunks are necessary, that
"the belief that judges are constrained by law ... is a deeply in-
grained feature of the legal culture" (p 194), and that this "situa-
tion is unlikely to change without profound and not necessarily
desirable changes in the political system" (p 193).
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III.
Perhaps Posner knows something even deeper, which is that
the call for a pragmatist program, for a demystifying of the legal
culture, for a clearing away of the debris of faith-based conceptual
systems, is at odds with the insight of heterogeneity, with the rec-
ognition that difference is a condition that cannot be overcome by
attaching ourselves to a bedrock level of social/empirical fact be-
cause that level, along with the facts seen as its components, is
itself an interpretive construction, an imaginative hazarding of the
world's particulars that is finally grounded in nothing stronger that
its own persuasiveness (with persuasiveness itself a function of the
number of desires this particular story about the world manages to
satisfy).
I said earlier that once pragmatism becomes a program it
turns into the essentialism it challenges; as an account of contin-
gency and of agreements that are conversationally not ontologically
based, it cannot without contradiction offer itself as a new and bet-
ter basis for doing business. Indeed, if the pragmatist account of
things is right, then everyone has always been a pragmatist any-
way; someone may pronounce in the grand language of founda-
tional theory, but since that theory will always be a rhetoric-an
edifice supported by premises that might be contested at any mo-
ment-such pronouncing is no less provisional and vulnerable than
"those made under [a] frankly ad hoc regime" (p 48). Nor will the
advent of a frankly ad hoc regime-one in which contingency and
the heterogeneity of value are publicly announced-make any op-
erational difference; awareness of contingency allows one neither to
master it (as if knowledge of an inescapable condition enabled you
to escape it) nor to be better at it (a quite incoherent notion). Once
a pragmatist account of the law (or anything else) has shown that
practice is not after all undergirded by an overarching set of im-
mutable principles, or by an infallible and impersonal method, or
by a neutral observation language, there isn't anything more to say
("[t]o say that one is a pragmatist is to say little" (p 28)), any-
where necessarily to go. You certainly can't go from a pragmatist
account, with its emphasis on the ceaseless process of human con-
struction and the endless and unpredictable achieving and
reachieving of conversational objectivity, to a brave new world
from which the constructions have been happily removed. Indeed,
if you take the anti-foundationalism of pragmatism seriously (as
Posner in his empiricism finally cannot), you will see that there is
absolutely nothing you can do with it.
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The point is one that puts me in a minority position in the
pragmatist camp, for most advocates of pragmatism (I have never
been one myself) assume that something must follow from the
pragmatist argument, that there are, in the words of Richard
Rorty's title, consequences of pragmatism.18 Rorty himself thinks
that, although at times it seems that the consequences he identifies
are so loosely related to pragmatism that the claim doesn't amount
to much. Nevertheless, he does repeatedly attach at least a hope to
the possible triumph of pragmatism, not Posner's hope for "a
method of social engineering ... susceptible of objective evalua-
tion" (p 122), but the hope that if we give up the search for just
such a method, write it off as an investment that didn't pan out,
we will turn from the (vain) search for "metaphysical comfort" 9 to
the comfort we can provide each other as human beings in the
same afoundational boat: "In the end, the pragmatists tell us, what
matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together
against the dark, not our hope of getting things right. '2 0
The idea is that if people would only stop trying to come up
with a standard of absolute right which could then be used to deni-
grate the beliefs and efforts of other people, they might spend
more time sympathetically engaging with those beliefs and learn-
ing to appreciate those efforts. Those who do this will improve
what Rorty believes to be a specifically pragmatist skill, the "skill
at imaginative identification," the "ability to envisage, and desire
to prevent, the actual and possible humiliation of others."'" More-
over, although this ability is in some sense an anti-method because
it involves the proliferation of perspectives rather than the narrow-
ing of them to the single perspective that is right and true, one
acquires it, according to Rorty, by a technique that is itself
methodical if not methodological: one practices "rediscription,"
not rediscription in the direction of what is really true, but redis-
cription as a temperamental willingness to try out vocabularies
other than our own in an effort "to expand our sense of 'us' as far
as we can."22 "We should stay on the lookout for marginalized peo-
ple-people whom we still instinctively think of as 'they' rather
than 'us'. We should try to notice our similarities with them."2 " In
18 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980) (Minnesota, 1982).
1' Id at 166.
20 Id.
21 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 93 (Cambridge, 1989).
21 Id at 196.
23 Id.
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that way, we may "create a more expansive sense of solidarity than
we presently have.""4 In the process, Rorty hopes, philosophy will
lose its orientation toward truth and become "one of the tech-
niques for reweaving our vocabulary of moral deliberation in order
to accommodate new beliefs (e.g., that women and blacks are capa-
ble of more than white males had thought, that property is not
sacred, that sexual matters are of merely private concern)."2 5
My problem with Rorty's formulations can be surfaced by fo-
cusing on this last sentence, which suggests, as other sentences do,
that there is a general non-specific skill or ability which, if we hone
it, will make us the kind of people likely to see that women and
blacks are capable of more than white men had thought, that prop-
erty is not sacred, that sexual matters are of merely private con-
cern. But in my view the direction is the other way around: first an
issue is raised, by real-life pressures as felt by men and women who
must make decisions or perform in public and private contexts,
and then, in the course of discussion or by virtue of the introduc-
tion of a new and arresting vocabulary, or by the pronouncements
of a particularly revered figure, or by a thousand other contingent
interventions, some of us might come to see the situation and its
components in new and different ways. Moreover, this "conver-
sion" experience, if it occurs, will not be attributable to a special
skill or ability that has been acquired through the regular practice
of rediscription-through empathy exercises-but rather to the
(contingent) fact that for this or that person a particular argument
or piece of testimony or preferred analogy or stream of light com-
ing through a window at the right moment just happened to
"take."
My point is that such moments which could be described (al-
though inaccurately I think) as expansions of sympathy, cannot be
planned, and cannot be planned for by developing a special em-
pathetic muscle. This leads me to proclaim Fish's first law of toler-
ance-dynamics (tolerance is Rorty's pragmatist virtue where Pos-
ner's is perceptual clarity): Tolerance is exercised in an inverse
proportion to there being anything at stake. If I go to hear a series
of papers on John Milton, I listen with an attention whose content
includes my own previously published work, the place of that work
in Milton studies, projects presently in process, etc., and therefore
as I listen (not after I listen) I perform involuntary acts of ap-





again"), anger ("he's got me all wrong") and others too embarrass-
ing to mention. But if I go to hear a series of papers on George
Eliot, whose novels I have read but not written about or even for-
mulated a position on; I listen in quite a different mode, one that
allows me to take a relatively cool pleasure at a display of contrast-
ing interpretive skills. Indeed, I might even be successively con-
vinced by five speakers who are in the process of vigorously de-
nouncing one another and never feel obliged to render a judgment
of the kind they are directing at one another. Now obviously I will
be exercising more tolerance, engaging more empathetically, in the
second scenario, but that will be because I have no investment in
George Eliot, whereas my investment in Milton has been growing
for more than twenty-five years and is at this point inseparable
from my sense of my career and therefore from my sense of myself.
What the example shows, I think, is that tolerance is not a
virtue with its own context-independent shape, but is rather a way
of relating or attending whose shape depends on the commitments
one already feels. The Rortyan injunctions "be ye tolerant" or
"learn to live with plurality" 26 or "notice suffering when it occurs"
or "expand our sense of 'us' ,,27 are like the biblical injunction "be
ye perfect" or the parental injunction "be good"; one wants to re-
spond, yes, but in relation to what? One cannot just be tolerant;
one is tolerant (or not) in the measure a given situation, complete
with various pressures and with the histories of its participants,
allows. "Avoid cruelty" is a directive that cries out for contextual-
ization and when put in a more qualified way-avoid cruelty when
you can; or avoid cruelty, all other things being equal; or avoid
cruelty except when the alternative seems worse-it is even clearer
that its force depends on how everything is filled in, on what is
already felt to be at stake in the situation. It is this sense of some-
thing at stake, something not just locally but universally, crucially,
urgent, that Rorty would like to see lessened if not eliminated; al-
though, as he reports ruefully, William James himself seemed una-
ble to let go of the feeling that life is "a real fight in which some-
thing is eternally gained for the universe by success."28 It is Rorty's
hope-ungrounded, as it must be given his (anti)principles-that if
"pragmatism were taken seriously, '2 9 if we conceived of ourselves
as creatures clinging together in a foundationless world rather than
" See id at 67.
27 See id at 196.
" Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism at 174 (cited in note 18).
29 Id.
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as philosophers in search of a foundation, we might cease exper-
iencing life as a fight, and we would be less likely to confront one
another across firmly drawn lines of battle.
As Rorty presents it, the vision is certainly an attractive one,
but his utopian consequence no more follows from pragmatism
than does Posner's empiricist consequence. Both theorists begin by
asserting the irreducibility of difference and the concomitant un-
availability of over-arching principles, but then go unaccountably
to the proclamation of an over-arching principle, in one case to the
principle of undistorted empirical inquiry and in the other to the
principle of ever more tolerant inquirers. The two programs differ
markedly, but they are similarly illegitimate in having as their
source an account from which no particular course of action neces-
sarily or even probably follows. In short, to repeat myself, they
confuse a pragmatist account with a pragmatist program and
thereby fail to distinguish between pragmatism as a truth we are
all living out and pragmatism as a truth we might be able to live
by. We are all living out pragmatism because we live in a world
bereft of transcendent truths and leak-proof logics (although some
may exist in a realm veiled from us) and therefore must make do
with the ragtag bag of metaphors, analogies, rules of thumb, inspi-
rational phrases, incantations, and jerry-built "reasons" that keep
the conversation going and bring it to temporary, and always revis-
able, conclusions.
However, we could only live by pragmatism if we could grasp
the pragmatist insight-that there are no universals or self-execut-
ing methods or self-declaring texts in sight-and make it into
something positive, use an awareness of contingency as a way ei-
ther of mastering it or perfecting it (in which case it would no
longer be contingency), turn ourselves (by design rather than as
the creatures of history) into something new. But while contin-
gency may be the answer to the question "what finally underwrites
the law?" it cannot be the answer to the question, "how does one
go about practicing law?" The answer to that question is that one
practices law by deploying all of the resources (doctrines, prece-
dents, rules, magic metaphors, standard concepts) the legal culture
offers. As an analyst or observer of the law, you may know that
those resources cannot finally be justified outside the culture's con-
fines; but, as a practitioner, justification from the outside is not
your business (you are not a philosopher or an anthropologist). As




One place you will not get them is in the practice of describing
the practice for which you are seeking a justification. The mistake
both Rorty and Posner make (albeit in different ways) is the mis-
take of thinking that a description of a practice has cash value in a
game other than the game of description. You may find (as Posner,
Rorty, and I all do) that it is with pragmatist categories that one
can best describe the law; but that does not mean that it is with
pragmatist categories that one can best practice the law or that
with a pragmatist description in place you have a new source of
justification; and, indeed, there is no reason to think that the re-
sults of an effort at description can be turned into a recipe either
for performance or the act of justifying. Description is itself a
practice complete with its own conventions, requirements, and in-
ternal justifications, all of which are necessarily distinct from the
terms of the practice that is its object.
The point speaks directly to the other large disagreement I
have with Posner's book-his position on the question of legal au-
tonomy. Posner believes that the ragtag eclectic content of legal
doctrine means that it cannot be a distinctive thing. The reasoning
is simple: since the law manifestly makes use of, and invokes as
authoritative, materials, doctrines, and norms from any number of
other disciplines and even non-disciplines (there seems no limit to
its indiscriminate borrowings), it must itself be multi-disciplinary
and therefore not autonomous. "Interdisciplinary legal theory is
inescapable" (p 439), he says, if only because "there is no such
thing as 'legal reasoning'" (p 459), only a "grab bag of informal
methods" (p 455), which includes rules, but rules that are "vague,
open-ended, tenuously grounded, highly contestable, and not
openly alterable but frequently altered" (p 455). But the fact that
an area of inquiry and practice incorporates material, concepts,
and methods from other areas in a mix that is volatile and variable
does not mean that there is nothing-no distinctive purpose or
perspective-guiding and controlling the mix. The reasoning that
if law is not pure, then law is not law, a discipline with its own
integrity, holds only if disciplinary integrity is understood in what
Posner calls the "strong" sense, "a field that rather than battening
on other fields [is] adequately-indeed optimally-cultivated by
the use of skills, knowledge, and experience that owe[] nothing to
other fields" (p 431).
Posner quite correctly observes that the law cannot meet this
strong requirement, but then neither can anything else. No field is
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self-sufficient in these absolute terms; every field depends both for
its legitimacy and operations on assumptions and materials it does
not contain but on which it draws, often in the spirit of "it goes
without saying" or "if you can't assume this, what can you as-
sume?" What makes a field a field-makes it a thing and not
something else (a poor thing but mine own)-is not an impossible
purity, but a steadfastness of purpose, a core sense of the enter-
prise, of what the field or discipline is for, of why society is willing
(if not always eager) to see its particular job done. The core sense
of disciplinary purpose is not destroyed by the presence in the field
of bits and pieces and sometimes whole cloths from other fields,
because when those bits and pieces enter, they do so in a form
demanded by the definitions, distinctions, conventions, problemat-
ics, and urgencies already in place.
This does not mean that a field remains unaltered at its core
by the entrance into it of "alien stuff"; a purpose that expands
itself by ingesting material previously external to it does not stay
the same. But even in its new form, it will still be the instantiation
in the world of the enterprise's project, a project whose shape may
vary so long as it retains its discritical identity as the shape now
being taken by a particular job of work (ensuring justice, under-
standing poetry, explaining finance, recovering the past). There is
no natural reason that any of these projects should continue for-
ever; the world may one day find itself without economics or liter-
ary criticism or history as identifiable disciplinary tasks. Before
that happens, however, the natural conservatism of disci-
plines-the survival instinct that makes them institutional illustra-
tions of Fish's first law (tolerance is exercised in an inverse propor-
tion to there being anything at stake)-will work to prevent
borrowed material from overwhelming the borrower. Despite the
recent millenarian calls to interdisciplinarity, disciplines will prove
remarkably resilient and difficult to kill.
I will have more to say about the lure of interdisciplinarity in
a moment, but for now I want to underline the point I have been
making: legal autonomy should not be understood as a state of im-
possible hermetic self-sufficiency, but as a state continually
achieved and re-achieved as the law takes unto itself and makes its
own (and in so doing alters the "own" it is making) the materials
that history and chance put in its way. Disciplinary identity is as-
serted and maintained not in an absolute opposition to difference
but in a perpetual recognition and overcoming of it by various acts
of assimilation and incorporation.
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That is why it is beside the point to complain, as Posner does,
that when the law takes up foreign concepts and materials it often
does so in crude and sloppy ways, failing to avail itself of the latest
up-to-date techniques and formulations. Early on, he observes that
although the law is obviously dependent on "ethical insights," it
declines "to look for the ethical and political materials of judgment
... in scholarly materials [and] statistical compendia," relying in-
stead on its own "previous decisions" (p 94). Later he makes a sim-
ilar point with respect to the philosophy of language:
If philosophers mount cogent attacks on simple-minded ideas
of textual determinacy-ideas that as it happens are the
unexamined assumptions of many lawyers and judges engaged
in interpreting statutory and constitutional texts-can the le-
gal profession brush aside the attacks with the assertion that
what lawyers and judges do when they interpret legal texts is
its own sort of thing? (p 440)
And by the same reasoning, shouldn't the "pieties of jurisprudence
... be discarded" so that "at long last" judges would "abandon the
rhetoric, and the reality, of formalist adjudication" (p 462)?
The answer to these questions was given long ago by Pound in
response to the realist program of "beginning with an objectively
scientific gathering of facts."80 Facts, declares Pound, "have to be
selected, and what is significant will be determined by some pic-
ture or ideal of the science and of the subject it treats.""1 In other
words (my words), the particular form in which materials from
other disciplines enter the law will be determined by the law's
sense of its own purpose and of the usefulness to that purpose of
"foreign" information. Pound notes that there have always been
calls for jurisprudence to "stand still"3 2 until metaphysicians or
ethicists or psychologists concluded their debates and determined
an authoritative scientific viewpoint, and yet, as he puts it, "cer-
tain general ideas ... served well enough for the legal science of
the last century."3 3 Jurisprudence "can't wait for psychologists to
agree (if they are likely to) and ... there is no need of waiting,"
because we "can reach a sufficient psychological basis for juristic
purposes from any of the important current psychologies."3
so Pound, 44 Harv L Rev at 700 (cited in note 17).
S1 Id.
31 Id at 705.
33 Id at 706.
" Id.
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"For juristic purposes": It is those purposes and not the pur-
poses at the core of the quarried discipline that rule. The fact that
a notion of the self or of the text or of intention is regarded by
psychology or philosophy or literary theory as the best notion go-
ing does not mean that it is the notion that best serves juristic
purposes. To this Posner might object that it is irresponsible for
jurists or anyone else to go about their business in the company of
discarded or discredited accounts of important matters; but again
one must point out that accounts are specific to enterprises, to
projects informed by their own sense of what needs to be done and
for what (usually metaphysical) reasons. It makes no sense to re-
quire that projects impelled by a different sense of what needs to
be done in relation to different (usually metaphysical) reasons be
faithful to, or even mindful of, the state of the art in the areas they
invade. Law will take what it needs, and "what it needs" will be
determined by its informing rationale and not the rationale of phi-
losophy, or literary criticism, or psychology, or economics.35
Posner doesn't see this because he has a different view of what
enterprises are or should be: he thinks that the point of an enter-
prise is to get at the empirical truth about something, and that
enterprises are different only in the sense that they have been as-
signed (or assigned themselves) different empirical somethings-
the mind, the past, the economy, the stars, the plants-to get at
the truth of. The trouble with law is that it has not accepted such
an assignment in the true empirical spirit: "law is not ready to
commit itself to concrete, practical goals across the board," but in-
stead keeps prating on about "intangibles such as the promotion of
human dignity, the securing of justice and fairness, and the impor-
tance of complying with the ideals or intentions of the framers of
the Constitution or of statutes" (p 123). In short, the law is a rogue
discipline that refuses to join the general effort to get things right,
and that is why the list of legal concepts ("metaphysical entities")
that must be discarded is so long as to amount to the discarding of
the entire legal culture.
This is not a conclusion that Posner himself reaches (in more
than one place he seems to affirm the distinctiveness he elsewhere
denies), but it is nevertheless a conclusion that follows inevitably
from his strong empiricism. If the "intangibles" he finds "too neb-
ulous for progress toward achieving them to be measured"
(p 123)-justice, fairness, the promotion of dignity-are removed
in favor of "concrete facts," the disciplinary map will have one less
3" That is why psychoanalysis in its classic form, discarded by mainstream psychology
today, is alive and well (and productively so) in English departments.
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country, and where there was law there will now be social science.
Were we to heed Posner's advice to get "rid of" the "carapace of
falsity and pretense" that has the effect of "obscuring the enter-
prise" (p 469), we would end up getting rid of the enterprise. In
doing so we would suffer a loss, not because justice, fairness, and
human dignity will have been lost-I believe them to be rhetorical
constructions just as Posner does-but because we will have de-
prived ourselves of the argumentative resources those abstractions
now stand for. We would no longer be able to say "what justice
requires" or "what fairness dictates" and then fill in those phrases
with the courses of action we prefer to take. That, after all, is the
law's job-to give us ways of re-describing limited partisan pro-
grams so that they can be presented as the natural outcomes of
abstract impersonal imperatives. Other disciplines have other
jobs-to rationalize aesthetic tastes or make intelligible pasts-and
they too have vocabularies that do not so much hook up with the
world as declare one.
Disciplines should not be thought of as joint partners cooper-
ating in a single job of work (one world and the ways we describe
it); they are what make certain jobs (and worlds) possible and even
conceivable (lawyering, literary criticism, economics, etc., are not
natural kinds, but the names of historical practices). And if we
want this or that job to keep on being done-if we want to use
notions of fairness and justice in order to move things in certain
directions-we must retain disciplinary vocabularies, not despite
the fact that they are incapable of independent justification, but
because they are incapable of justification, except from the inside.
Posner sees the matter differently because he does think that
there is a single job of work to do-the job of getting the empirical
facts right-and he thinks of disciplines as either participating in
the task or going off into self-indulgent "theological" flights. He is,
in other words, at least part of the time, an essentialist (the dis-
missal of categories as merely "verbal" (p 433) is a dead giveaway),
someone for whom the present state of disciplinary affairs with its
turf battles and special claims will in time be "subsumed under a
broader theory" (p 374), that is, under a general unified science.
Despite the many acknowledgments of heterogeneity in the book,
he is finally committed to a brave empirical future in which hetero-
geneity will have been, if not eliminated, at least grounded and
firmly tethered to something more real.
That is why Posner is an advocate of interdisciplinary work
which has the effect, he says, of "blurring the boundaries between
disciplines" (p 432). Presumably at some future date the "blur-
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ring" will amount to a wholesale effacing, and the disciplines will
number only one. (Thou shalt have no other disciplines before me.)
This is the basic premise and declared hope of interdisciplinarity
(more a religion than a project) as it has recently been described
by Julie Thompson Klein.3 6 Klein identifies the interdisciplinary
impulse with the desire for "a unified science, general knowledge,
synthesis, and the integration of knowledge. '3 7 Disciplinary bound-
aries, she tells us, divide fraternal paths of inquiry and also force
individuals to develop specialized parts of themselves and ignore
the "'whole' person."3" The result is a society that is itself frag-
mented and must therefore be "restored to wholeness."3 " Klein de-
plores the combative vocabulary characteristic of both intra and
inter-disciplinary discussions, which, she says, leads to "imperialis-
tic claims 40 and a sense of disciplines as "'warring fortresses,' "41
and she laments the fact that our very "vocabulary-indeed, our
whole logic of classification-pre-disposes us to think in terms of
disciplinarity. ' 42
The suggestion is that if we could only change our vocabulary,
no longer speak in a way that created hierarchies and divisions, we
would not experience ourselves as locally situated, but as members
of a vast interconnected community; in short, through interdis-
ciplinarity, we can eliminate difference (ye shall see the interdisci-
plinary truth and it shall make you free). Difference, however, is
not a remediable state; it is the bottom-line fact of the human con-
dition, the condition of being a finite creature, and therefore a
creature whose perspective is not general (that would be a contra-
diction in terms), but partial (although that partiality can never be
experienced as such, and those who think it can be unwittingly re-
instate the objective viewpoint they begin by repudiating). The
"predisposition," as Klein puts it, to think in terms of selves and
others, better and worse, mine and yours, right and wrong, to
think, that is, in terms rooted in local experiences and beliefs, is
not one that could be altered unless we ourselves could be altered,
could be turned from situated beings-viewing and constituting
the world from an angle-into beings who were at once nowhere
" Julie Thompson Klein, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice (Wayne
State, 1989).
37 Id at 19.
38 Id at 23.
39 Id at 41.
40 Id at 79.
41 Id at 78.
42 Id at 77.
1474 [57:1447
Almost Pragmatism
and everywhere. That is the implicit, and sometimes explicit, goal
of the interdisciplinary program. It is also the goal, whether ac-
knowledged or not, of a program that would tie all disciplinary
work to a single universal task. The promise of interdisciplinarity,
like the promise of a pragmatism that offers either expanded sym-
pathy (Rorty) or bed-rock reality (Posner) is the promise that we
shall become as gods. Eve believed it. I don't.
V.
As I look back over this essay, it seems that I have managed to
write something other than a positive review after all, especially
since the proportion of critical to praising pages is 2 to 1. Never-
theless, I wish to return at the conclusion to the panegyric mode. I
think I have cited and discussed every passage with which I disa-
gree, which means that in a book of 469 pages I have found fault
with maybe 45. On every other page, I have found pleasure, illumi-
nation, support, knowledge, incredible breadth, considerable
depth, and above all, a sense of humor that spares no one and least
of all Posner himself. (A book that punctures Bruce Ackerman's
faith in dialogue by observing that "Hitler... could talk as well as
Ackerman" (p 338)-a proposition I tend to doubt-has a lot going
for it.)
Not long ago I was discussing the state of legal theory with
Joseph Raz and rehearsing (somewhat churlishly) my criticism of
Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire.3 Raz stopped me in my tracks
by asking, "What other book written since Hart's The Concept of
Law is so comprehensive and raises so many of the crucial ques-
tions?" I can now answer, "Posner's The Problems of
Jurisprudence."
4" Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard, 1986).
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